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TO CURB OR NOT TO CURB: APPLYING HONEYCUTT TO 
THE JUDICIAL OVERREACH OF MONEY JUDGMENT 
FORFEITURES 
Matthew L. Allison* 
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, asset forfeiture, both civilly and criminally, has
been ripe for reform as groups on both sides of the political divide 
have advocated that the system has been abused and corrupted over 
the years.1  There have been calls to curb the abuses in both civil and 
criminal asset forfeiture with legislation currently pending in 
Congress.2  Although there have been calls to end the abuse, in the 
summer of 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a plan to 
emphasize and prioritize the pursuit of civil asset forfeitures, a 
pursuit that the Obama administration had chosen to wind down.3 
One current type of asset forfeiture that is used in criminal cases is 
called “money judgment forfeiture.”4  Although this type of forfeiture 
is not directly authorized or allowed by current statutes, various 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have carved out a judge-made loophole to 
allow it.5  However, in the recently decided Supreme Court case, 
Honeycutt v. United States,6 the Court struck down a separate type of 
criminal asset forfeiture by ruling that joint and several liability7 was 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, University of Baltimore School of Law; M.B.A. and B.S.,
Marketing and Sociology, 2007, West Virginia Wesleyan College.  The author would
like to thank Professor Phillip J. Closius for his support and guidance; to my parents,
for all of their love and encouragement; and to Laura and Madison, for their love and
everlasting support.  A very special thank you to the current and former members of
the University of Baltimore Law Review.
1. See infra Section II.C.
2. Nick Sibilla, Bipartisan Bills in Congress Would Defund Federal Civil Forfeiture,
DEA Marijuana Seizures, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/instituteforjustice/2018/01/19/bipartisan-bills-in-congress-would-defund-
federal-civil-forfeiture-dea-marijuana-seizures.
3. Sessions Reinstates Asset Forfeiture Policy at Justice Department, CBS NEWS (July
19, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sessions-signals-more-police-
property-seizures-coming-from-justice-department/.
4. See infra Section II.B.3.
5. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
6. 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017).
7. See infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text.
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not authorized by the statute and should not be applied in the case.8  
This Comment will argue that the rule established in Honeycutt 
should be applied in the same manner to the subject area of money 
judgment forfeitures to overturn Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions 
allowing money judgment forfeitures.9  This Comment will also 
advocate for future legislation to solve the problem of abuse.10 
Part II will explore the history of asset forfeiture in the United 
States, provide an overview of the three different types of asset 
forfeiture, and discuss the abuses of the system.11  Part II will also 
provide an explanation of money judgment forfeitures and how the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal shaped the surrounding case law.12   
Part III will survey how the Supreme Court, in recent years, has 
begun reigning in the governmental reach of asset forfeiture.13  It will 
also discuss the new ruling in Honeycutt.14  Part IV will analyze how 
the ruling and analysis in Honeycutt should be extended and applied 
to money judgment forfeitures.15  It will also discuss whether 
Congress is possibly in a better position to tackle the challenge of 
reforming money judgment forfeitures as well as the system of asset 
forfeiture in general.16  A possible amendment to the criminal asset 
forfeiture statute will be proposed and examined, one that Congress 
would be able to implement into law to help curtail the abuse of the 
system.17 
II. OVERVIEW OF ASSET FORFEITURE
A. A Brief Overview of the History of Asset Forfeiture
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “forfeiture” in multiple ways
including “[t]he divestiture of property without compensation” and 
“[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, 
breach of obligation, or neglect of duty.”18  “Asset forfeiture occurs 
8. See infra Section III.B.
9. See infra Section IV.A.
10. See infra Section IV.B.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Section II.B.3.
13. See infra Section III.A.
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. See infra Section IV.A.
16. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See infra Section IV.B.
18. Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  “Civil forfeiture” is defined
as “[a]n in rem proceeding brought by the government against property that either
facilitated a crime or was acquired as a result of criminal activity.”  Id.  “Criminal
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when the government seizes and forfeits ownership in an individual’s 
or company’s assets because the individual, the company or the 
property itself was connected to or represents the proceeds of certain 
types of unlawful activity.”19  The laws of asset forfeiture have been 
described as “extremely complicated,”20 and the subject area has 
received “little scholarly attention”21 in academic circles. 
The concept of asset forfeiture has been around for centuries.22  It 
has been a part of the law in the United States since the founding of 
the country.23  The United States adopted the idea of asset forfeiture 
from the practices of the British.24  The British developed and “used 
forfeiture as a weapon to combat piracy and customs offenses on the 
high seas.”25  Following the American Revolution, Congress 
“enacted [numerous] statutes authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of 
ships and cargo involved in customs offenses.”26  However, criminal 
asset forfeiture was specifically banned by the drafters of the 
constitution as they “prohibited the English practice of ‘forfeiture of 
estate,’ a criminal penalty that deprived a convicted felon of the 
ability to transfer any of his property at death.”27  Criminal asset 
forfeiture” is defined as “[a] governmental proceeding brought against a person to 
seize property as punishment for the person’s criminal behavior.”  Id. 
19. ELLEN ZIMILES & JEFFREY LOCKE, DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 16.1, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2017).
20. Catherine E. McCaw, Asset Forfeiture as a Form of Punishment: A Case For
Integrating Asset Forfeiture into Criminal Sentencing, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 181, 185
(2011).
21. Id. at 183.
22. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.3 n.4.
The concept of asset forfeiture has a deep and rich history.  It can 
be traced back to Exodus where an ox is sacrificed to atone for an 
offense: “If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die:  then the 
ox shall surely be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the 
owner of the ox shall be quit.”  Exodus 21:28.  In the Middle 
Ages and the law of deodand, it was stated: “[W]here a man 
killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be 
forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner.”  United 
States. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 141 
L. Ed. 2d 314, 172 A.L.R. Fed. 705 (1998).
Id. 
23. See Edmund W. Searby, A Broadening Consensus to Narrow Asset Forfeiture, L. J. 
NEWSLS., Sept. 2017, at 1, http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournal
newsletters/2017/09/01/a-broadening-consensus-to-narrow-asset-forfeiture-3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. STEFAN D. CASELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2d ed. 2013).
27. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(d) (4th ed. 2017).
274 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 48 
forfeiture did not return in the legal system until the passing of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in the 
1970s.28  
The asset forfeiture laws remained entrenched in the area of 
customs laws until the early 1970s.29  In 1970, asset forfeiture began 
to expand when Congress created the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act.30  This law allowed the federal 
government to “subject property used to facilitate narcotics activity 
to asset forfeiture.”31  Congress expanded the law in 1978 to allow 
“the government to forfeit the proceeds of drug crimes.”32  Congress 
expanded the Comprehensive Prevention and Control Act even 
further in 1984 by authorizing the government to seize property that 
was used to facilitate drug crimes.33  This “allowed the government 
to attack the profitability of criminal activity and to take any property 
that made the crime easier to commit or harder to detect.”34 
The rules of asset forfeiture have been patched together over the 
years and are found scattered throughout different civil and criminal 
codes.35  “There is neither a common law of forfeiture nor a single 
provision authorizing forfeiture in all cases.”36  In his article on asset 
forfeiture, Stefan D. Cassella, an expert in asset forfeiture,37 
comments that “[t]he closest Congress has come to enacting one, all-
powerful forfeiture statute is 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), which 
authorizes the forfeiture of the proceeds of over 200 different state 
and federal crimes.”38  This statute provides a prosecutor with the 
tools to recover the proceeds that a defendant gained from conducting 
a crime.39  A sampling of the federal crimes covered by the statute 
are “fraud, bribery, embezzlement and theft,” and state crimes 
include “murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, 
28. See id.
29. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken.
30. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 17 S. AFR. 
J. CRIM. JUST. 347, 349 (2004).
37. See About Us, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, LLC, http://assetforfeiturelaw.us/?page_id=67
(last visited Jan. 13, 2019).  Stefan D. Cassella is a former federal prosecutor with
over thirty years of experience in asset forfeiture and now serves as CEO of Asset
Forfeiture Law, LLC.  Id.
38. Cassella, supra note 36, at 350.
39. See id.
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extortion, obscenity, and state drug trafficking.”40  As Casella 
explains in his article, asset forfeiture is important for three main 
reasons.41  It provides prosecutors and law enforcement officers a 
way to remove criminal items from the hands of criminals, it 
provides a remedy for victims to recover property or be compensated 
for their losses, and finally, it removes the proceeds that criminals 
gained from their illegal activities.42 
B. Essential Requirements and the Three Main Types of
Asset Forfeiture
There are two essential requirements for the government to obtain 
title of an asset through asset forfeiture.43  The “government must 
demonstrate that the property to be forfeited has the requisite 
relationship to criminal activity” and then “the government must 
show that the law allows it to obtain property when the property 
bears that relationship to a particular crime.”44  The government can 
then seek to use asset forfeiture under “five separate theories” 
including:  
(i) contraband — goods that are per se illegal on their face,
(ii) proceeds of a crime, (iii) instrumentality — the
instruments used to commit a crime, (iv) facilitation —
property used or intended to be used to facilitate illegal
activity, and (v) enterprise, usually under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).45
Once the government establishes that “property is subject to 
forfeiture, it must demonstrate that the forfeiture of this property does 
not constitute an excessive fine.”46  There are three main types of 
asset forfeiture that the government can utilize to obtain property, 
including administrative, civil, and criminal asset forfeiture.47  
40. Id.
41. Id. at 347–48.
42. Id.
43. McCaw, supra note 20, at 186.
44. Id.
45. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.4.
46. McCaw, supra note 20, at 187.
47. See infra Section II.C.
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1. Administrative Asset Forfeiture
Administrative asset forfeiture is the simplest type of forfeiture and
does not have to be accomplished through the court system or a 
judicial process.48  This is because the act of administrative asset 
forfeiture is considered a “proceeding[] [that is] . . . used for 
uncontested seizures of property that is worth less than $500,000 and 
is not real property.”49   
Administrative forfeiture can be conducted by a law enforcement 
agency and is considered an administrative matter that does not need 
to be adjudicated in court.50  This usually occurs when a federal law 
enforcement agency has seized property during the scope of an 
investigation.51  The agency has to comply with the statutory 
requirements and ensure that the judicial warrant was executed with 
probable cause; thus meeting the requirement that the property is 
subject to forfeiture.52  The agency must then place a notice in a 
public forum for anyone to come forward and contest the validity of 
the seized property.53  Real property is the major exception in this 
case and may not be seized and forfeited under this type of asset 
forfeiture; however, many other forms of property can be forfeited in 
this manner.54   
Prior to the enactment of CAFRA, administrative asset forfeiture 
proceedings were similar to abandonment cases.55  Due process 
became a concern and Congress added rules to protect property 
owners by giving agencies specific time frames for initiating 
administrative proceedings and allowing property owners to file 
claims for the property.56  “The agency’s failure to follow these 
procedures is subject to judicial review” by the courts.57  If an 
individual comes forward and contests the administrative forfeiture 
48. Cassella, supra note 36, at 353–54.
49. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.2.
50. Cassella, supra note 36, at 353.
51. Id. at 354.
52. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) (2012).
53. Cassella, supra note 36, at 354.
54. Id. at 355; see also 18 U.S.C. § 985(a) (2000).
55. Cassella, supra note 36, at 354.
56. Id. at 354–55.
57. Id. at 355; see also United States v. Schinnell, 80 F.3d 1064, 1069 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“Once the administrative forfeiture was completed, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to review the forfeiture except for failure to comply with procedural
requirements or to comport with due process.”) (first citing United States v. Arreola–
Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 191 & nn.13–14 (5th Cir. 1995); then citing Linarez v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 211–14 (7th Cir. 1993); and then citing United States v.
Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1995)).
2019 Judicial Overreach of Money Judgment Forfeitures 277 
claim, the government will then have to commence a separate 
claim.58  The government may then choose from two options of 
forfeiture proceedings, to commence a civil asset forfeiture or a 
criminal asset forfeiture proceeding.59 
2. Civil Asset Forfeiture
Civil asset forfeiture is a separate action from a criminal
proceeding.60  It occurs when the government files an action against a 
specific property, an in rem61 action, and not against a specific 
person.62  Cassella explains:   
[e]ssentially then, when the government commences an in
rem forfeiture action it is saying, “This property was derived
from or was used to commit a criminal offence.  For a
variety of public policy and law enforcement reasons, it
should be confiscated.  Anyone who has a legal interest in
the property and who wishes to contest the forfeiture may
now do so.”63
Civil asset forfeiture “does not depend on there being a criminal 
conviction, [therefore] the forfeiture action may be filed before 
indictment, after indictment, or if there is no indictment at all.”64   
Thus, for example, property owned by a defendant who is 
convicted of a criminal offense can be the subject of a civil 
forfeiture action based on the conduct underlying the 
criminal offense, but because the action is against the 
58. Cassella, supra note 36, at 355.
59. See id.
60. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.2.
61. “In rem” is a Latin term that means “[i]nvolving or determining the status of a thing,
and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing.”  In rem,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
62. Cassella, supra note 36, at 357.  The following cases have ruled to uphold the idea
that in a civil asset forfeiture proceeding, the action is brought against the property
and not the person.  See, e.g., United States v. All Funds in Account Nos.
747.034/278, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. $734,578.82 in U.S.
Currency, 286 F.3d 641, 653, 655, 657 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. One-Sixth
Share Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 660, 663–64, 669–70 (4th Cir. 2003).
63. Cassella, supra note 36, at 358.
64. Id. at 357.
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property itself as opposed to the defendant, it constitutes 
civil and not criminal forfeiture.65   
By enforcing the proceeding against the property compared to the 
individual, it makes it easy to identify what the government is trying 
to obtain in a forfeiture proceeding and “give[s] anyone and everyone 
with an interest in that property the opportunity to come into court at 
one time and contest the forfeiture action.”66 
A civil asset forfeiture proceeding that goes to trial consists of two 
separate stages.67  First, the government files a complaint that the 
property is subject to forfeiture under a specific applicable statute and 
must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is 
subject to forfeiture.”68  The government must provide evidence that 
the property in the proceeding is connected to the illegal activity 
committed by the owner.69   
If the government establishes that the property in the asset 
forfeiture proceeding is subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of 
the evidence, then the claimant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(d), can 
offer an innocent owner defense.70  Congress ratified 18 U.S.C. § 
983(d), providing the claimant with an innocent owner defense to a 
civil asset forfeiture, which is demonstrated by the claimant asserting 
“that they had no knowledge that the property was being used for 
illegal purposes.”71  If the claimant knew of the illegal activity, then 
“did all that [the claimant] reasonably could be expected to do under 
the circumstances to terminate such use of the property” or if the 
claimant can establish that he or she were “bona fide purchasers for 
value who, at the time of purchase, ‘did not know and was reasonably 
without cause to believe that the property was subject to 
forfeiture.’”72  If the claimant cannot satisfy any of these elements, 
then the “court will enter judgment for the government and title to the 
property will pass to the United States.”73 
65. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.2.
66. Cassella, supra note 36, at 358.
67. McCaw, supra note 20, at 191.
68. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012).
69. McCaw, supra note 20, at 191.
70. Id. at 191–92.
71. Id. at 192.
72. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012).  “An innocent owner’s interest in property
shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute.  The claimant shall have the
burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the
evidence.”  § 983(d)(1).
73. Cassella, supra note 36, at 359.
2019 Judicial Overreach of Money Judgment Forfeitures 279 
The Supreme Court has delivered two landmark decisions 
regarding civil asset forfeiture proceedings.74  First, the Supreme 
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to a civil 
asset forfeiture action.75  In United States v. Ursery, the Supreme 
Court held “Congress long has authorized the Government to bring 
parallel criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, and 
this Court consistently has found civil forfeitures not to constitute 
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”76  Next, the 
Supreme Court held that a claimant challenging a civil forfeiture 
proceeding is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.77  
The Supreme Court stated “that the common law as received in this 
country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution gave a remedy 
in rem in cases of forfeiture, and that it is a ‘common law remedy’ 
and one which ‘the common law is competent to give.’”78  
3. Criminal Asset Forfeiture
Criminal asset forfeiture occurs as a part of the criminal sentencing
process and begins only after a defendant has been convicted.79  It is 
considered an in personam80 action that is “directed at the defendant 
personally.”81  The criminal trial is “bifurcated”82 and the forfeiture 
“is considered a part of that defendant’s criminal punishment.”83  In 
74. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil asset forfeiture proceedings); C.J. Hendry Co.
v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 153 (1943) (holding that the Seventh Amendment applies to
civil asset forfeiture proceedings).
75. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288.  In Ursery, the defendant was arrested and convicted for
manufacturing marijuana and was sentenced to sixty-three months in prison.  Id. at
271. The United States government initiated forfeiture proceedings on Ursery’s house
where the contraband was found, and Ursery argued that civil asset forfeiture
constituted a punishment and thus the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause.  Id.
76. Id. at 287–88.
77. C.J. Hendry Co., 318 U.S. at 153.
78. Id.; see also United States v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th
Cir. 2003) (“In addition, the district court’s decision that they lack statutory standing
was a ruling on the merits of their claims that violated their right to a jury trial.”).
79. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.2.
80. “In personam” is a Latin term that means “[i]nvolving or determining the personal
rights and obligations of the parties.”  In personam, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).  In civil procedure it means an action that is “brought against a person
rather than property.”  Id.
81. Cassella, supra note 36, at 356.
82. Id.
83. McCaw, supra note 20, at 193.
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the indictment of the defendant’s charges, the government must 
include the forfeiture allegations.84  However, the government is not 
required to provide a detailed list of the items in the indictment.85  
After the defendant has been convicted, the government must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a nexus 
between the property and the crime committed.86  “[T]he court (or 
jury) must determine that the property in question was in fact the 
proceeds of the offence, or constituted facilitating property, property 
‘involved’ in the offence, or whatever relationship between the 
property and the offence that the applicable forfeiture statute happens 
to require.”87  Once the government can prove this important nexus, 
then the court will enter judgment against the defendant and the 
property will be forfeited as part of the criminal sentence.88   
“Because this type of action [, criminal asset forfeiture,] is against 
a person, the Court may order forfeiture of all profits from a crime 
regardless of whether those profits still exist and regardless of the 
defendant’s assets.”89  The possible assets that can be forfeited in a 
criminal case are “limited by statute to that property possessing a 
prescribed relationship with the criminal activity.”90  These 
categories of assets include the “‘proceeds’ of the underlying 
criminal activity” and the “property used to ‘facilitate’ that 
activity.”91  Although these categories are narrowed by statute, 
Cassella argues that criminal asset forfeiture has an advantage over 
civil asset forfeiture in that “the forfeiture is directed against the 
defendant personally and not at particular pieces of property[;] the 
court can enter a money judgment against the defendant for the value 
of the property, or can order the forfeiture of substitute assets, if the 
property has been dissipated or cannot be found.”92  
Under the criminal asset forfeiture statute, the government is 
authorized to seize assets that a defendant has gained illegally from 
84. Id.
85. E.g., United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1024–25 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
forfeiture does not have to be alleged with particularity); United States v. Raimondo,
721 F.2d 476, 477 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding Rule 7(c)(2) does not require an
indictment to furnish an itemized list of each item subject to forfeiture).
86. Cassella, supra note 36, at 356.
87. Id. at 356–57.
88. Id. at 357.
89. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.2.
90. LAFAVE, supra note 27.
91. Id.
92. Cassella, supra note 36, at 356; see also United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d
19, 42–43 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that criminal forfeiture can take the form of either
money judgment, directly forfeitable property, or substitute assets).
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committing a crime.93  Section 853 of 21 U.S.C. authorizes the court 
to use substitute property if necessary when the assets that were 
gained from committing the crime are no longer available for 
criminal forfeiture for reasons, including where the property cannot 
be located or has been given to a third party.94   
However, one of the issues that has arisen out of this process is 
what happens when the defendant does not currently have the assets 
to satisfy a criminal forfeiture judgment, but then later gains 
additional assets legally.95  Currently, the statute limits the 
government’s ability to seize property only if the government can 
trace that the property being forfeited was due to the defendant’s 
criminal activity by proving a nexus between the property and 
criminal activity.96  Several Circuit Courts of Appeal have 
established a judge-made loophole, known as money judgment 
forfeitures, for this particular issue.97  Eight Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have upheld a ruling that “allows the government to forfeit 
property without satisfying the statutory requirement that the 
93. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012).
94. See § 853(a)(1)–(3) (“(a) Property Subject to criminal forfeiture[.]  Any person
convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective
of any provision of State Law—(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; (2)
any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and (3) in the case of a
person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of
section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to any property described
in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or
contractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal
enterprise.”).  See also § 853(p)(1)–(2)  (“(p) Forfeiture of substitute property[.]
(1) In general[.] Paragraph (2) of this subsection shall apply, if any property described
in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission of the defendant— (A) cannot be
located upon the exercise of due diligence; (B) has been transferred or sold to, or
deposited with, a third party; (C) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(D) has been substantially diminished in value; or (E) has been commingled with
other property which cannot be divided without difficulty.  (2) Substitute property[.]
In any case described in any of subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1), the
court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant, up to the value
of any property described in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1), as
applicable.”).
95. See Cassella, supra note 36, at 364.
96. See § 853.
97. Steven L. Kessler, SCOTUS Limits Criminal Forfeiture in ‘Honeycutt,’ N.Y. L.J.,
(Aug. 17, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202795
826407/SCOTUS-Limits-Criminal-Forfeiture-in-Honeycutt/.
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government trace the property sought to be forfeited to the 
defendant’s criminal activity.”98  This means that the government can 
apply a money judgment forfeiture to a defendant with no assets at 
the time of judgment and then, when the defendant later obtains 
assets, he or she will have to satisfy the criminal asset forfeiture 
judgment that was initially imposed at sentencing.99 
In United States v. Smith, the lower court ordered a $10,000 
forfeiture of drug proceeds; however, the funds from the criminal 
conduct could not be located.100  The defendant, at the time of 
sentencing, had insufficient personal assets to pay the $10,000, so the 
substitute assets provision of § 853 was not effective.101  Therefore, 
the court decided to enter a money judgment forfeiture for the 
$10,000.102 
On appeal, the defendant raised the issue of whether or not “such a 
judgment is authorized by the provision of § 853(p) for forfeiture of 
‘any other property of the defendant.’”103  The Eighth Circuit noted 
that “[a]t least five [other] circuits have held that § 853 permits 
imposition of a money judgment on a defendant who has no assets at 
the time of sentencing.”104  The court agreed with the other Circuits’ 
conclusions in that “[t]he statute is phrased broadly, allowing 
forfeiture of ‘any other property of the defendant,’ 21 U.S.C. § 
853(p), without a temporal limit.”105  In other words, the court held 
that since the statute does not place a time limit on the criminal asset 
forfeiture, then it is satisfactory to enforce the money judgment when 
the defendant obtains any future assets.106  The court further 
explained that “[w]hen that broad text is considered together with the 
express statutory direction that the provision is to ‘be liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,’ . . . there is little doubt 
98. Id.; see also United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Hampton, 732 F.3d 687, 688, 690–92 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Padron, 527 F.3d 1156, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361,
1377 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Jarvis, 499 F.3d 1196, 1205–06 (10th Cir.
2007); United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2006); United
States v. Casey, 444 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d
42, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2006).
99. Alice W. Dery, Overview of Asset Forfeiture, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 21, 2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2012/06/article-02-dery.pdf.
100. United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 2011).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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that ‘any other property’ extends to property acquired by the 
defendant after the imposition of sentence.”107  The Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the other Circuits’ analysis: that “a contrary 
interpretation would give defendants an incentive to dissipate ill-
gotten assets in order to avoid a forfeiture sanction, a result that 
would frustrate the remedial purpose of the statute in contravention 
of § 853(o).”108  The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the various 
Circuits’ decisions in upholding such money judgment forfeitures.109 
C. Abuse of the System and Response by Congress
A major concern regarding asset forfeiture is that the system is
abused by law enforcement agencies and the federal government.110  
There are reports and statistics that show that many law enforcement 
agencies use civil asset forfeiture to make a profit.111  In 2010, the 
Institute for Justice released statistics and a report on the abuse of the 
civil asset forfeiture system by police agencies.112  The report argues 
that because assets gained though civil asset forfeiture proceedings 
can be kept by the government,113 “[t]his incentive has led to [the] 
concern that civil forfeiture encourages policing for profit, as 
agencies pursue forfeitures to boost their budgets at the expense of 
other policing priorities.”114  As an example, the U.S. Department of 
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Kessler, supra note 97.
110. The Marshall Project is a “nonpartisan, nonprofit news organization that seeks to
create and sustain a sense of national urgency about the U.S. criminal justice system.”
About, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/about (last visited
Jan. 13, 2019).  The website keeps a running list of headlines related to asset
forfeiture abuse.  See Asset Forfeiture Abuse: A Curated Collection of Links,
MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/2217-asset-forfei
ture-abuse (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
111. MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET 
FORFEITURE, INST. FOR JUST. 6 (2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf; see also John Malcolm, Civil Asset Forfeiture:
Good Intentions Gone Awry and the Need for Reform, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 20,
2015), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/civil-asset-forfeiture-good-
intentions-gone-awry-and-the-need-reform (providing several anecdotal stories of
asset forfeiture abuse including a chief of police describing civil asset forfeiture as
“pennies from heaven” and a how a city attorney “was caught on videotape telling a
roomful of people how police officers waited outside a bar hoping that the owner of a
2008 Mercedes would walk out drunk because they ‘could hardly wait’ to get their
hands on the car.”).
112. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 6.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund contained over $1 billion in net 
assets from asset forfeiture in 2008.115  According to the study, 
“[o]nly 29 states clearly require law enforcement to collect and report 
forfeiture data” and “[i]n most states, we know nothing or next-to-
nothing about the use of civil forfeiture or its proceeds.”116  
In 2000, after a growing call to reform asset forfeiture,117 Congress 
enacted a new law entitled the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
(CAFRA).118  CAFRA provided changes mostly in the area of civil 
asset forfeiture119 and  
created three statutes: (i) 18 U.S.C. § 983, which provides 
procedural rules for civil forfeiture proceedings, (ii) 18 
U.S.C. § 985, which provides procedural rules for the civil 
forfeiture of real property, and (iii) 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b), 
which governs the return of property to claimants in the case 
of a wrongful civil or criminal forfeiture.120   
Some of the major reforms included in CAFRA were: “(i) strict 
procedural requirements, (ii) shifting the burden of proof for 
forfeiture from the property owner to the government, and (iii) 
explicitly laying out the innocent owner defense.”121  The enactment 
of CAFRA also resulted in an expansion of criminal forfeiture law.122  
CAFRA authorized the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), which 
allowed the government to use criminal asset forfeiture for anything 
that civil forfeiture was authorized for.123  Furthermore:   
[w]hile there are “dozens of statutes that provide criminal
forfeiture authority directly,” where a criminal statute has
no forfeiture provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) is often viewed
by courts as a “bridge” or “gap-filler” between civil and
criminal forfeiture “in that it permits criminal forfeiture
when no criminal forfeiture provision applies to the crime
115. Id.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Stephen J. Dunn, Nothing Civil About Asset Forfeiture, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2013,
3:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephendunn/2013/02/18/asset-forfeiture-is-
anything-but-civil/.
118. ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.3; see also Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202.
119. See ZIMILES & LOCKE, supra note 19, § 16.3.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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charged against a particular defendant but civil forfeiture for 
that charged crime is nonetheless authorized.”124   
Even after the passage of CAFRA, there have still been continuing 
complaints about the abuse of civil asset forfeiture.125 
III.  JUDICIAL CHANGE AND HONEYCUTT V. UNITED
STATES
Asset forfeiture, as a concept and judicial tool, has become 
entrenched in how the government seizes property.126  Even the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the value of asset forfeiture by 
declaring that the “statutes serve important governmental interests 
such as ‘separating a criminal from his ill-gotten gains,’ [and] 
‘returning property, in full, to those wrongfully deprived or 
defrauded of it,’ and ‘lessen[ing] the economic power’ of criminal 
enterprises.”127  However, over the years, there have been increasing 
calls to curb the abuse of the asset forfeiture system.128  Surprisingly, 
organizations that traditionally disagree with one another based on 
their political views are unified in their criticisms of asset 
forfeiture.129  CAFRA was considered a response by Congress to 
reform parts of the asset forfeiture laws, but has only been considered 
a step in the right direction on a path of reformation.130  In 2017, 
Congress proposed additional legislation to deal with the calls for 
further reform of the asset forfeiture system.131 
A. Judicial Crackdown on Asset Forfeiture Abuse
The Supreme Court has shown its own signs of taking action to
restrain how far the government can stretch its reach by using 
different types of asset forfeiture.132  In the past, the Supreme Court 
relied on a doctrine that focused on “‘the guilt’ of the property and 
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.
126. See supra Sections II.B.1–3.
127. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1631 (2017) (quoting Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629–30 (1989)).
128. See supra Section II.C.
129. Searby, supra note 23, at 1 (“[P]olitically diverse organizations as the Heritage
Foundation, the Cato Institute, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have all expressed concerns for the
perceived abuses of asset forfeiture.”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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not the innocence of the owner.”133  However, in 1998, the Court 
began taking steps in a different direction.134   
In United States v. Bajakajian, Mr. Bajakajian attempted to leave 
the country without reporting “that he was transporting more than 
$10,000 in currency.”135  Mr. Bajakajian was attempting to transport 
$357,100 out of the country.136  Federal law states that if an 
individual willfully violates 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A),137 he or she 
is subject to forfeiture of the entire amount that the individual was 
attempting to transport out of the country.138  However, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Bajakajian that forfeiture of the entire amount “would 
violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”139  
The Supreme Court reasoned that “full forfeiture of respondent’s 
currency would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his 
offense.”140    
Another restriction on the government came in the plurality 
opinion in Luis v. United States, where the Supreme Court held “that 
the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets needed to retain 
counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment.”141  In October 
2012, Ms. Luis was charged “with paying kickbacks, conspiring to 
commit fraud, and engaging in other crimes all related to 
healthcare.”142  A court can freeze certain assets of a criminal 
133. Searby, supra note 23, at 5; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).  In
Bennis, the petitioner was a joint owner of a vehicle and the co-owner was arrested for
sexual activity with a prostitute.  Bennis, 516 U.S. at 443.  Under a Michigan statute,
the vehicle was forfeited because of the illegal activity.  Id.  The petitioner argued that
she was unaware of the illegal activity and the forfeiture violated her due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 444.  After reviewing precedent, the Court
ruled the forfeiture valid and “under these cases the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not protect her interest against forfeiture by the
government.”  Id. at 446, 449.
134. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
136. Id. at 325.
137. If an individual is transporting more than $10,000 in U.S. currency out of the United
States, then it must be reported.  31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (2012).  If a person
willfully violates this statute, the government can seek forfeiture of the entire amount.
See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2012).
138. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324; 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
139. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 2.
140. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324.
141. Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1088 (2016); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court
Limits When the Government Can Freeze Defendants’ Assets, WASH. POST (Mar. 30,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-limits-wh
en-the-government-can-freeze-defendants-assets/2016/03/30/7c496324-f69d-11e5-
9804-537defcc3cf6_story.html.
142. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1087.
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defendant when the defendant is accused of violating federal 
healthcare laws per authority set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1345.143  The 
court order freezing Ms. Luis’s assets also included freezing 
untainted funds.144  Ms. Luis argued that the asset freeze prevented 
her from “obtaining counsel of her choice.”145  The Supreme Court 
agreed with Ms. Luis and reasoned “the nature and importance of the 
constitutional right taken together with the nature of the assets” led 
the Court to that conclusion.146 
B. Honeycutt v. United States
On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Honeycutt v. United States.147  The holding in this case provides 
more evidence that the Supreme Court is actively attempting to 
restrain the government’s abuse of the asset forfeiture system.148  In 
Honeycutt, two brothers were indicted for selling iodine from their 
hardware store when they knew it was possible that the iodine was 
being used for manufacturing methamphetamine.149  
The “[g]overnment sought forfeiture money judgments against each 
brother in the amount of $269,751.98, which represented the 
hardware store’s profits from the sale of Polar Pure,” the product 
which contained the iodine.150  Although one brother did not have 
any “controlling interest in the store” and “did not stand to benefit 
personally” as a store employee or an owner, the brother was held 
“jointly [and severally] liable for the profit from the illegal sales.”151  
The District Court denied the forfeiture request; however, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the decision and applied the forfeiture to both 
brothers.152      
The Supreme Court, in an 8-0 decision, ruled against allowing the 
government to use joint and several liability in criminal asset 
forfeiture cases, reversing all of the Circuit Courts that had 
previously ruled in favor of allowing joint and several liability.153   
143. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012).
144. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1088.
145. Id.
146. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1630, 1635 (2017).
148. See id. at 1634–35.
149. Id. at 1630.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1631.
152. Id.
153. Kessler, supra note 97.
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Considered “[a] creature of tort law, joint and several liability 
‘applies when there has been a judgment against multiple 
defendants.’”154  The Court defined joint and several liability in 
Honeycutt as follows: “[i]f two or more defendants jointly cause 
harm, each defendant is held liable for the entire amount of the harm; 
provided, however, that the plaintiff recover[s] only once for the full 
amount.”155  The Court also held:   
Application of that principle in forfeiture context when two 
or more defendants conspire to violate the law would 
require that each defendant be held liable for a forfeiture 
judgment based not only on property that he used in or 
acquired because of the crime, but also on property obtained 
by his co-conspirator.156   
The attachment of joint and several liability, similar to money 
judgment forfeitures, is not directly authorized by statute.157 
The question before the Court was “whether, under § 853, a 
defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for property that 
his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant 
himself did not acquire.”158  The Court examined the statute and 
determined that “Congress did not authorize the Government to 
confiscate substitute property from other defendants or co-
conspirators; it authorized the government to confiscate assets only 
from the defendant who initially acquired the property and who bears 
responsibility for its dissipation.”159  The Court further stated that 
“[p]ermitting the [g]overnment to force other co-conspirators to turn 
over untainted substitute property would allow the [g]overnment to 
circumvent Congress’s carefully constructed statutory scheme.”160  In 
ruling on this matter, the Supreme Court stated that “the standard is 
not whether Congress has forbidden a remedy, but whether it has 
specifically authorized it.”161 
154. Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoting McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202,
220–21 (1994)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Kessler, supra note 97.
158. Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1630.
159. Id. at 1634.
160. Id.
161. Kessler, supra note 97.
2019 Judicial Overreach of Money Judgment Forfeitures 289 
IV.  APPLICATION OF HONEYCUTT AND CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
A. Applying Honeycutt Analysis to Money Judgment Forfeitures
Similar to joint and several liability in criminal asset forfeitures,
money judgment forfeitures are not currently authorized by statute.162  
Money judgment forfeitures have been created as a judge-made 
loophole that many of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have upheld.163  
Forfeiture is a strictly statutory creation and does not have any 
background in common law.164  Because of this and how the 
Supreme Court ruled in Honeycutt, the Court should also apply this 
reasoning to money judgment forfeitures.165  In Honeycutt, the 
Supreme Court established a new test and standard which states that 
when a statute is enacted by Congress, it is important to understand 
the difference between whether Congress has explicitly forbidden a 
remedy or “whether it has specifically authorized it.”166  In the case 
of joint and several liability and money judgment forfeitures, the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have upheld using these forfeiture tools 
even though the statute did not specifically authorize them.167  By 
allowing this judicial overreach of the Circuit Courts, it unlocks the 
possibility that courts could continue to create more judge-made law 
based on whatever Congress has not specifically banned by a 
particular statute.168  The Supreme Court in Honeycutt correctly 
rejected this reasoning.169  By reviewing the forfeiture statute’s 
legislative history, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress had 
considered and decided against expanding what is explicitly stated in 
the statute.170  The Supreme Court articulated “[t]here is no basis to 
read such an end run into the statute.”171  In a footnote, the Supreme 
Court drove this rational home by stating that “the Court cannot 
construe a statute in a way that negates its plain text, and here, 
Congress expressly limited forfeiture to tainted property that the 
162. Id.
163. See supra Section II.B.3.
164. See supra Section II.A.
165. Kessler, supra note 97.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Honeycutt, 816 F.3d 262 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct.
1626 (2017); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
168. Kessler, supra note 97.
169. See Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1634 (2017).
170. See id.
171. Id.
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defendant obtained.”172  Since money judgment forfeitures have 
spawned from a similar creation of rulings that are not based on 
actual language in the statute,173 the Supreme Court should overturn 
the decisions authorizing judicial overreach in the form of money 
judgment forfeiture using the same reasoning as Honeycutt.174     
Furthermore, part of the importance of our justice system is that a 
defendant receives a definitive punishment at the end of a trial.175  
One of the foundations of both the civil and criminal judicial systems 
is the idea behind the finality of a court’s decision.176  A defendant, 
even a convicted one, has the right to this finality.177  There are 
several important reasons for this.  First, our criminal justice system 
values the rehabilitation of criminals.178  A convicted individual will 
have a harder time rejoining society and subsequently contributing to 
the economy, if after serving their sentence, they find a job, only to 
have these new monetary gains taken by a money judgment forfeiture 
from a past judgment.179  By not placing a time limit on a money 
judgment forfeiture, a defendant will constantly be worried about 
their future assets.180  This only seems to be a further abuse of the 
asset forfeiture system, and it has not been specifically authorized by 
Congress through the criminal asset forfeiture statute.181   
Second, although outside the scope of this Comment, there is an 
argument to be made that the tacking on of a money judgment 
forfeiture well after the finality of the judgment could be an Eighth 
Amendment issue.182  It is unclear whether the application of money 
judgment forfeitures on an individual could possibly constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment.183 
172. Id. at 1635 n.2.
173. See supra Section II.B.3.
174. Kessler, supra note 97.
175. See Sentencing, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sentencing (last
visited Jan. 13, 2019).
176. See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 924–25 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam) (stating that
finality is an important goal of any justice system).
177. See id.
178. See LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 175.
179. See Kevin R. Reitz, Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of
Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1738–39 (2015).
180. The imposition of sanctions is justified by the argument that imposing those sanctions
furthers the remedial purpose of the forfeiture statutes, regardless of whether the
criminal defendant has the assets or not.  See, e.g., United States v. Casey, 444 F.3d
1071, 1074 (2006).
181. Kessler, supra note 97.
182. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
183. See id.
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B. Congress Addressing Asset Forfeiture Abuse and Overreach
If the Supreme Court does not take steps to apply the same analysis
to money judgment forfeiture, then Congress should provide an 
amendment to the statute to reduce ambiguity and clarify the scope of 
the statute’s reach.  This would help continue to curb the abuse of 
asset forfeiture laws in the United States, as exampled by the 
overreach of local law enforcement agencies.184  It appears that this 
would be a simple solution for Congress; however, passing 
legislation appears to be difficult in the current political environment 
in the nation’s capital.185  It is hard to determine if the political 
willpower is available to create a new statute or simply amend the 
current statute.186 
Congress should consider two options in amending the statute.  The 
first option is rather simple.  Congress should merely amend the 
statute to state “No other asset forfeiture remedy is authorized that is 
not specifically stated in the statute.”  This language would align with 
the reasoning in Honeycutt, and also strike down the Circuit Courts 
of Appeal upholding of money judgment forfeitures.187  It would 
make clear that the only options for asset forfeiture would be the ones 
that are provided for in the statute.  The government would have 
more specific instructions on what asset forfeiture options were 
available, thus continuing to curb the abuse of the system.188 
The second option is for Congress to place a time limit on the 
application of money judgment forfeitures.  Under the current 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court at any time can order 
forfeiture if substitute property is found and falls under an existing 
applicable forfeiture statute.189  However, under § 853(a) of the 
United States Code, forfeiture is limited to tainted property acquired 
or used by the defendant.190  Since future earnings would not be 
considered tainted, future forfeiture would be unavailable.191  
Congress could amend the statute to use money judgment forfeitures 
184. See supra Section II.C.
185. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only
Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/
27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html.
186. See id.
187. See Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1633–34 (2017).
188. See supra Section II.C; see generally Civil Assets Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
(CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202.
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(e)(1).
190. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012).
191. See id.
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on future earnings if it felt that this type of forfeiture was in the best 
interests of justice.  Congress should determine what a reasonable 
amount of time would be to allow a money judgment forfeiture.  A 
reasonable amount of time would probably range in the one to three 
year period because this is less than the five-year standard limitation 
for most federal offenses,192 but it provides a defendant with a more 
reasonable time frame to reenter society without fear of a post 
sentence enforcement of a money judgment forfeiture.193    
The effects of this reform would be twofold.  First, it would allow a 
defendant to not be in fear of gaining personal assets in the future and 
having to directly turn them over to the forfeiture as stated above.194  
Second, it would provide a framework for the courts to understand 
that simply because a statute does not specifically deny an action 
does not mean that the action can be freely taken by the courts.  This 
would further align with the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Honeycutt.195  
V. CONCLUSION
Asset forfeiture in the United States is a system that is ripe for
reform.196  There have been particular abuses in the system that, if 
left unchecked, could continue to provide government and law 
enforcement agencies easy ways to profit from the system of civil 
and criminal asset forfeiture.197  The Supreme Court, through its 
decision in Honeycutt, has demonstrated that the system needs to 
reduce the level of abuse.198  The Supreme Court should apply its 
reasoning in Honeycutt to money judgment forfeitures, and if not, 
then Congress should enact new legislation to combat the unfairness 
of the judge-made loophole.199 
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012).
193. See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 115, 116–17 (2008).
194. See supra Section IV.A.
195. See Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1634–35 (2017).
196. See supra Section II.C.
197. See supra Section II.C.
198. See supra Section III.B.
199. See supra Sections IV.A–B.
